Lanvin Group's China Business Just Collapsed Everywhere. And It is Chinese-owned.
Greater China revenue at St. John Knits, FY2025: down 51%.
At Lanvin, the house brand: down 77%.
At Sergio Rossi: down 36%.
At Wolford: down 46%.
And Lanvin Group is Chinese-owned. The company is headquartered in Shanghai. It is controlled by Fosun. The CEO is Chinese. This should have been the easiest China story in luxury. It just became the worst.
What Lanvin Just Reported
On April 30, 2026, Lanvin Group (NYSE: LANV) released its audited full-year 2025 results. The Group revenue: €240 million, down 18% year-over-year. 2024 revenue was €292 million. 2023 was €387 million. In two years, the Group has lost roughly 38% of its revenue base.
Here's the brand-by-brand damage in Greater China specifically:
Lanvin (the house brand, Peter Copping newly installed as creative director): Greater China 2025 revenue €934K, down 77% from 2024's €4.1M. Down 87% from 2023's €7.2M
Wolford: Greater China 2025 revenue €4.96M, down 36%. Down 58% from 2023
Sergio Rossi: Greater China 2025 revenue €5.49M, down 18% from 2024. Down 40% from 2023
St. John Knits: Greater China 2025 revenue €7.21M, down 51% from 2024
For comparison, the Group's total Greater China revenue was roughly €48 million in 2023. In 2025 it's under €19 million. That's a 60% collapse in 24 months.
North America, run primarily on St. John Knits, was the only resilient region. EMEA held steady through Wolford. Greater China is the hole.
Why This Is Worse Than It Looks
Most Western luxury brands that struggle in China can at least fall back on the excuse that "we don't understand the market." Lanvin Group cannot use that excuse.
The Group is headquartered in Shanghai. Its chairman, Zhen Huang, is Chinese. The controlling shareholder Fosun is one of China's largest private conglomerates. The company's stated mission from IPO was to "bridge Western luxury heritage and Chinese market access."
That was the pitch to investors in 2022. "We own Western heritage brands. We have Chinese operational know-how and capital. China will be our home-court advantage."
The home court just turned into the worst market in the portfolio.
Four brands. All declining in Greater China. All declining faster in Greater China than in any other region. All declining at a time when comparable brands are recovering. Brunello Cucinelli grew China double-digits in Q1 2026. Hermès grew small but positive. Even Gucci, with its -24% disaster quarter, is rebuilding momentum. Lanvin Group brands are just... falling.
Three Reasons the Fosun-Lanvin Model Isn't Working
Reason 1: Capital without creative momentum is nothing. Fosun's strategy was "buy Western luxury brands, inject Chinese capital and Chinese retail network." The problem: Chinese retail network alone doesn't generate brand desire. Chinese luxury consumers in 2026 are more sophisticated, more pingti-aware, more cultural-alignment focused than they were in 2022. A Chinese-owned brand that still looks, feels, and designs "Western mid-tier luxury" is not automatically loved by Chinese consumers just because the holding company is Chinese.
Reason 2: Four undifferentiated brands is worse than two strong ones. Lanvin's portfolio (Lanvin, Wolford, Sergio Rossi, St. John Knits) overlaps in target demographic, price tier, and category. None of them has a clear "I own this category in China" position. Meanwhile, the brands winning in China right now (Hermès in leather goods, Brunello Cucinelli in cashmere, Moncler in puffers, Pelliot in outdoor) each own one specific thing. Lanvin Group owns nothing specific.
Reason 3: Peter Copping is a name, not a revolution. Lanvin Group announced Peter Copping as Lanvin's creative director in 2024, positioning this as the turnaround catalyst. The 2025 results show the Lanvin brand declined 30% globally and 77% in Greater China under his watch. Creative director names buy patience from investors. They do not automatically buy Chinese consumer attention. In 2026, Chinese consumers follow designers, cultural moments, and aesthetic momentum, not announcements.
What Goes Wrong Next
Lanvin's playbook for 2026 (per the earnings release) includes:
Selective store closures (retail rationalization)
Continued brand repositioning under Peter Copping for Lanvin
Caruso carve-out (divesting non-core tailoring business)
"Leaner operations" and "cost discipline"
Read it carefully. The plan is to shrink. Close stores. Cut costs. Wait.
This is what a company does when it has given up on the growth story and is managing for survival. It's the opposite of what successful luxury brands do in China. Successful brands invest in flagship stores, scale DTC operations, commit to Rednote and Douyin marketing, and build new product lines that reflect Chinese taste. None of that is in the Lanvin 2026 plan.
The risk from here is straightforward. If Lanvin Group's Greater China revenue declines another 30-40% in 2026, at least one of the four brands will either get sold or shut down in that market. Store closures in Tier 2-3 Chinese cities are basically certain. The Shanghai headquarters function itself may get restructured.
What Western Luxury Brands Should Take Away
Lanvin Group's collapse is a case study you should study closely if you operate or plan to operate any Western luxury brand in China. Here's your checklist:
Chinese ownership is not a China strategy. Lanvin Group has the ownership structure many Western brands have been told is the key to China success. It doesn't work without everything else. The ownership matters less than the product, the creative, the cultural resonance, and the operational discipline.
Multi-brand portfolios rarely work in China. LVMH has 75 brands. They work because each one has decades of brand heritage, resources, and distinct category positioning. A 4-brand portfolio with overlapping positioning (Lanvin, Wolford, Sergio Rossi, St. John) fractures attention and dilutes resources. Most Western groups going into China should bring one hero brand, not a portfolio.
Peter Copping, a creative director alone, won't save your China business. Creative directors get media attention. They don't make cash register sales in 12 months. If you are depending on a new creative director to turn around your China performance, you need a 36-48 month runway with patient capital. Most brands don't have that.
Caruso carve-outs are an accounting maneuver, not a strategy. Divesting non-core assets improves the P&L ratios but does not grow revenue. If the core business is declining, selling the side businesses just makes the core business decline in a smaller envelope.
Watch the regional breakdowns, not the group totals. Lanvin Group's -18% global decline looks bad but is survivable with a good story. The 51%, 77%, 36%, 46% Greater China declines across all four brands are the actual signal. Always read the segment data.
Lanvin Group was supposed to be the counter-example to every other struggling luxury brand in China. A Chinese-owned Western luxury house with Shanghai headquarters, Chinese capital, Chinese creative talent in leadership, Chinese retail networks. The structural advantages were supposed to compound.
Instead the company just posted the worst Greater China collapse of any publicly-traded luxury group in 2025.
If you were betting that the answer to Western luxury's China problem was "sell to a Chinese holding company," the answer is in. It's not enough. Not even close.
The real work still has to happen. At the brand, at the product, at the story, at the store. Lanvin Group didn't do it. And the math is now public.
