Outdoor Voices is going to China. Through the Musinsa playbook operator.
The "Doing Things" brand is doing one big thing right now.
Outdoor Voices, the Austin-born athleisure community brand that peaked at $90M revenue in 2022 then collapsed during a board-vs-founder war, is officially entering China and Southeast Asia. Through a strategic partnership with Misto Holdings Corp. announced June 19 by Consortium Brand Partners (the OV parent since 2024).
If you've been following our coverage of Alo Yoga's Hong Kong + Shanghai + Beijing entry last week, this is the next chapter in the same story. The post-Lululemon, post-pandemic, post-quiet-luxury athleisure category is being repopulated in China by a wave of American brands that finally figured out you don't enter China alone.
You enter China through a Korean operator who already knows how to do it.
What just happened
On June 19, 2026, Consortium Brand Partners (the New York-based brand-acquisition platform that bought Outdoor Voices in March 2024 for an undisclosed amount) announced the formal partnership with Misto Holdings Corp. to expand Outdoor Voices into Greater China and Southeast Asia.
The structure (based on the LinkedIn announcement and Misto's broader portfolio context):
Outdoor Voices retains brand HQ in New York / Austin
Misto Holdings operates the Greater China + Southeast Asia commercial business
Product, brand creative, and global narrative stay with Outdoor Voices
Store leases, e-commerce platform integration, local talent, and operational execution sit with Misto
Initial focus: Greater China (mainland + Hong Kong + Taiwan) + Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand initially)
Timeline for first physical stores: not publicly disclosed; mainland China retail openings expected 2027
The strategic positioning is the most interesting part. CBP's announcement framed it as "scaling thoughtfully while maintaining the brand authenticity and customer connection." Translation: don't repeat the 2018-2023 Outdoor Voices mistake of growing too fast with low conviction. Pick a partner that gets the brand DNA.
Who Misto Holdings actually is
If you haven't tracked the Misto Holdings name, here's the 30-second briefing.
Misto Holdings Corp. is a Korean fashion-and-lifestyle operating group that has quietly become one of the most important Asian-region operators for Western brands. Key positions in the portfolio:
Fila Korea (operating partner, multi-decade)
Matin Kim (acquired stake; helping the Korean brand expand into mainland China)
Musinsa (strategic distribution partnership; Anta also recently signed an Anta-Musinsa K-fashion-into-China deal in June)
Multiple US brand China-licenses (operator profile across athleisure, lifestyle, casual)
Misto's playbook for bringing a Western brand into Greater China:
Test demand via Xiaohongshu and Tmall livestream commerce first (Misto ran this exact playbook for Mardi Mercredi and Matin Kim in June)
Open Hong Kong or Shanghai concept store as the first physical proof point
Roll out tier-1 mall expansion only after the e-commerce signal is validated
Use Korean designer-brand network for cross-promotion and authenticity
Tap Musinsa-style aesthetic curation to differentiate from the saturated Lululemon-Alo-Nike middle of the market
That's a much smarter operating template than the standard "open a Tmall store and hope for the best" Western brand entry.
Why Outdoor Voices was the right brand for this template
Look at OV's history. The brand peaked in 2022 at ~$90M revenue, built on:
The "Doing Things" community campaign (pastel-colored ad creative, real customers in real motion, anti-performance-brand messaging)
Strong Brooklyn / Austin / Los Angeles cultural credibility
A devoted micro-community that bought 3-4 pieces per year per customer
An athleisure aesthetic that was visibly different from Lululemon's technical-precision vibe
Then the brand stumbled. Founder Tyler Haney was pushed out in 2020. The brand chased growth via wholesale and discount channels. Revenue fell from $90M to ~$15M by 2024. Stores closed. The brand became a cautionary tale.
CBP bought the brand in March 2024 for a fraction of the previous private valuation. Tyler Haney returned to the board. The reset began. Public messaging shifted back to community + Doing Things. The brand started rebuilding the niche cultural relevance that made it work in 2018-2022.
For China entry, that reset matters. The Chinese 2026 athleisure consumer is over the generic-premium-athletic-apparel category. The customer wants brands with cultural specificity, community attachment, and aesthetic-difference. Lululemon owns the high-performance-yoga lane. Alo owns the celebrity-Hollywood-lifestyle lane. Nike owns the broad-performance lane. Outdoor Voices can plausibly own the "anti-Lululemon, play-don't-perform, community-first" lane... if the operating partner gets it.
Misto Holdings appears to get it.
Why this is the new template for Western brand China entry
Look at the last 90 days of Western brand China entries:
Alo Yoga entered China via wholly-owned Shanghai subsidiary, hired ex-Miu Miu/Givenchy/Prada/Armani China President Zhu Junwei, ex-LVMH HR head Andrew Nip. Direct DTC model.
Outdoor Voices entering China via Misto Holdings Korean-operator partnership. Operator-led model.
Snow Peak handed China operations to Biemlofen + GAMSUNG via 3-party strategic cooperation (Japan + Korea + China). Hybrid licensee model.
Häagen-Dazs licensed China operations to Lemon Season investor group (General Mills retains global brand). License-out model.
Pizza Hut spun off China to Yum China via 50-year master franchise. Permanent franchise spin model.
Oatly has its Greater China management team in MBO talks. Management buyout model.
Tim Hortons China rebooting under Zhang Guohua (ex-Nestlé Greater China). Local-CEO reset model.
Reebok closing Tmall flagship under ABG; comeback via Xinrui Sports operator. Operator swap model.
Each Western brand is choosing a different China-operating model based on its category, brand-equity strength, and operational capability. The "DTC wholly-owned" model (Alo) requires deep brand-equity + capital. The "Korean operator" model (Outdoor Voices) requires a strong creative brand + an experienced partner. The "Chinese licensee" model (Snow Peak, Häagen-Dazs) requires giving up margin in exchange for execution speed.
There's no single right answer. There is a right answer for your specific brand. Picking it correctly is the most important strategic decision your China entry will make.
What the China athleisure macro actually looks like
For context on why OV is timing this well: the Chinese athleisure market is on a sustained tear:
Athleisure market in Asia Pacific +10.9% CAGR projected 2026-2033
China expected to reach 9.7% CAGR in premium sportswear globally through 2030 (the highest CAGR globally)
China sportswear / athletic footwear market hit RMB 600B in 2025 (from RMB 500B in 2023)
Daily-commuting as primary use case for outdoor sportswear reached 74% in 2026 (vs 57% professional outdoor activity)
Sportswear is no longer bought for the sport
That last line is the killer. The Chinese customer is buying Outdoor Voices not to "do outdoor things." They're buying it to live indoor lives with outdoor-codes attached. That makes OV's "Doing Things" brand promise easier to translate. Doing things doesn't have to mean climbing mountains. It can mean walking the dog, getting coffee, going to brunch, taking a photo.
That's the OV thesis. Misto Holdings just bet on it.
What you should do
If you sell athleisure, lifestyle, or community-first apparel into China, here's the checklist:
Decide your China-operating model 12 months before your first store opens. DTC wholly-owned, Korean operator, Chinese licensee, license-out, JV, or co-brand are each viable. Picking wrong is the #1 China entry failure mode.
Pre-test demand via livestream and Xiaohongshu before committing to physical retail. Misto's playbook for Matin Kim and Mardi Mercredi proved the test-demand-first model. Adopt it before signing your first lease.
Identify your single-sentence brand differentiation against the Lululemon / Alo / Nike middle. OV's "anti-performance, community-first, Doing Things" lane is its weapon. If your brand can't articulate the equivalent in one sentence, you don't have a China entry positioning.
Pair your operator with your category specificity. Misto Holdings makes sense for OV because OV's aesthetic adjacency to Korean fashion is real. A pure-performance technical-running brand might need a different partner (Anta + Musinsa or Topsports for example). Match the operator to the brand-DNA.
Budget for community programming, not just product launch. OV's community programming (running clubs, dog walks, Doing Things meet-ups) is its core marketing asset. The China brand activation needs to recreate that community layer locally. Lululemon's Great Wall stumble shows what happens when community programming gets outsourced poorly.
Track Outdoor Voices' China rollout as your timeline reference. Mid-2026 announcement, late 2026-early 2027 e-commerce test demand, mid-2027 first physical store, 2028 multi-city rollout. That's the new standard cadence. Plan against it.
The closing read
Outdoor Voices died in 2024 and got bought for parts. The brand came back in 2025 with the founder back on the board and the "Doing Things" promise restored. Now in 2026 it's entering China and Southeast Asia through a Korean operator that runs the most credible Asian-distribution playbook for foreign athleisure brands.
The Chinese athleisure consumer is the world's most demanding athleisure customer. They've been over-served by Lululemon for 10 years. Alo just landed. Outdoor Voices is next. The category is repopulating with American brands that bring cultural specificity, community programming, and a real anti-corporate vibe.
If your brand's value proposition is identical to Lululemon's, your 2027 entry plan is already obsolete. If your brand's value proposition is genuinely different, the Misto Holdings template just gave you a roadmap. Read it.
